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Abstract
The market for paintings by well-known artists is booming despite widespread concern 
about art crime and difficulties in establishing provenance. Public law enforcement is 
imperfect, and court cases often are deemed problematic. So how is the thriving art mar-
ket governed in practice? We analyze the protocols used by the top auction houses to 
identify and resolve problems of illicit supply—fakes, forgeries and items with defective 
legal titles—through the lens of institutional analysis. We uncover a polycentric private 
governance system in which different actors govern distinct but overlapping issue areas, 
motivated by profit, prestige, or the search for truth. When the financial stakes rise, oppor-
tunistic behavior undermines the credibility of private governance. We argue that as liti-
gious, super-rich investors entered the art market, the interaction between public law and 
the traditional private governance system restricted the supply of “blue chip” art, driving 
the escalation of prices.
Keywords Art market · Fraud · Theft · Private enforcement of rights
JEL Classification K42 · P140 · Z11
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an explosion in the prices of prestigious art objects (New York 
Times 2012; Reuters 2016). In 2017, the painting Salvator Mundi, attributed to Leonardo 
da Vinci, set a new world record at USD 450 million (ArtBasel 2018). Even lesser known 
works of major artists now command million-dollar price tags (The Independent 2014). 
Yet, the art market continuously is challenged by criminals. Art is portable and the mar-
ket famously is opaque (The Economist 2013; The Guardian 2016). Many transactions 
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are consummated in cash or in kind, making art a potential vehicle for money laundering 
and capital flight (Economist 2013; Deloitte 2016). The FBI estimates that thieves steal 
art objects worth between USD 4 billion and 6 billion worldwide every year (Artbusiness 
2015). Looted antiquities are a significant source of insurgent and terrorist funding (Finan-
cial Times 2015). Successful forgeries have been sold for millions of US dollars (Financial 
Times 2016). Some commentators consider art and cultural property crime to be the third 
largest criminal market after drugs and weapons (FBI 2012; The Times 2014). A survey of 
industry professionals conducted by Deloitte (2016, p. 143) reports that “around 75% of all 
stakeholders surveyed agree that ‘authenticity, lack of provenance, forgery, and attribution’ 
are the biggest threats to credibility and trust in the art market.”
Despite such concerns, the global art market generated sales of $67.4 billion in 2018, 
of which the top auction houses Christie’s and Sotheby’s accounted for $7 billion and $6.4 
billion, respectively; 40% of total art sales came from items priced more than USD 1 mil-
lion (ArtBasel 2019). What explains buyers’ apparent confidence in what clearly is a very 
tricky market? Only very limited public resources are allocated to art crime. Few countries 
have dedicated art crime teams and their budgets are under pressure (FBI 2012). The legal 
process for the restitution of stolen objects and countering art fraud is complicated: “[L]iti-
gation is hugely expensive and inconvenient for private individuals and businesses alike…” 
(Deloitte 2016, p. 140). Moreover, critical media coverage of trials means that “nobody 
looks good in court.”1 Instead, buyers and sellers largely rely on the “traditional … hand-
shake culture of the art trade.” (Deloitte 2016, p. 156).
This article applies institutional analysis to examine the private governance architecture 
in the auction market for the highest-valued fine art (Aligica and Tarko 2012; McGinnis 
2016; Ostrom 2010). A multiplicity of private decision-makers has created an intricate sys-
tem of norms, rules and processes to maintain the trust of buyers and sellers. Rules are 
enforced in pursuit of private profit and personal prestige, thus maintaining a vibrant trade 
at the top of the art market that is surprisingly robust against crime.
We also explore the evolving relationship and inherent tension between formal and 
informal governance. Unlike previous generations of art collectors, today’s dissatisfied art 
investors, fund managers, and the super-rich are more likely to turn to litigation to resolve 
disputes. Court judgments call the existing rules, norms and processes in the art market 
into question, resulting in ever more risk-averse behavior regarding attributions and titles. 
Thus, litigation pushes certain types of artworks out of the market (into “limbo”), artifi-
cially restricting supply. The resulting price inflation encourages private agents to innovate 
and develop better governance solutions.
1.1  Art crime and the law
We focus on two major challenges to market confidence.2 Firstly, criminals, opportunists 
and bona fide owners want to sell stolen art, whether from individual heists or large-scale 
theft during genocides and wars, such as the expropriation of property from Jewish fami-
lies in Nazi Germany. Secondly, criminals respond to rising prices by producing ever more 
1 Interview with auction house employee, February 2017.
2 Further challenges, such as money laundering, price manipulation, anti-competitive behavior and con-
flicts of interest (Deloitte 2016), are beyond the scope of this paper.
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plausible forgeries, “improve” existing work with questionable provenance details,3 or pass 
off early copies as originals.
Profits on any object that crosses from the grey/illegal/fake market into the bona fide art 
market are large. Objects without or with dubious provenance fetch a fraction of the price 
of an equivalent object with full legal documentation (Financial Times 2015). Art on the 
black market sells for just 7–10% of its open market value (FBI 2012). The returns on suc-
cessful forgeries can be huge (Amore 2015; Charney 2015). The key weakness in the mar-
ket arises from the passions of collectors: “It is sometimes difficult for even the most cool-
headed financial professional to remain emotionless when he or she is about to acquire 
what could be the final cornerstone of a personal art collection…” (Deloitte 2016, p. 156). 
Thus, pieces with “dubious provenance” and “debated attribution” can enter the market.
“Dubious” provenance indicates that the object’s documentation appears deliberately 
vague, is inconsistent or unlikely, or is missing altogether. “Debated attributions” occur 
when specialists cannot reach consensus regarding authorship. Indeed, the highest returns 
on art are made when newly discovered objects, known as “sleepers”, eventually are 
accepted as autograph works of famous masters. Obviously, nothing is wrong with trying 
to rehabilitate a “lost” masterpiece. However, passionate collectors unintentionally can cre-
ate a market for (affordable) objects from the black market (Watson 2007; Felch and Fram-
molino 2011). Criminals benefit even if just a few dealers and collectors operate on a “no 
questions asked” basis (The Guardian 2015) or pursue a strategy of “optical due diligence” 
(Lervik and Balcells 2014, p. 138). Accordingly, the art market has been described as “one 
of the last Wild-West businesses…” (The Economist 2013).
Governments have four tools to clamp down on criminal and deviant behavior in the art 
market. First, customs’ officers can inspect and seize suspect objects as they cross interna-
tional borders. Second, the police can intervene if a stolen object is exhibited publicly or 
listed for public auction (Gill and Tsirogiannis 2016). In some jurisdictions, forgeries can 
be seized and destroyed (The Art Newspaper March 2014). Third, the original owners of 
a stolen object may be able to bring a legal claim against the current owner. Fourth, buy-
ers who have been deliberately or negligently misled about the value or provenance of an 
object can sue the seller (otherwise, caveat emptor applies). Yet, few countries maintain 
police “art squads”. Notable exceptions are the United States (the FBI), Italy (the Cara-
binieri Division for the Protection of Cultural Heritage) and the United Kingdom (the 
Metropolitan Police Art and Antiques Unit). They all do excellent jobs in very difficult 
circumstances, sometimes with the help of volunteers (FBI 2012). Nonetheless, resource 
constraints mean that the recovery of stolen items is rare (2% to 6%) and successful prose-
cutions are even rarer (Durney 2011; FBI 2012). Notwithstanding a few high-profile cases, 
art crime rarely is pursued in court (Chappell and Polk 2009)—unless a legal precedent is 
sought, or an accused party is completely uncooperative. Art law disputes often involve 
parties from different cultural and legal backgrounds, complicating the legal process for 
establishing title (Bandle and Theurich 2011; Roodt 2015). For many collectors and (the 
descendants of expropriated) original owners, litigation is either impracticable or they want 
to avoid the (usually negative) publicity generated by court cases. We therefore argue that 
although laws provide a framework for negotiation and dispute settlement, the art market 
largely is governed privately.
3 “Provenance” refers to documents proving the identities of an object’s artist or past owners, such as 
inventory lists, auction and collection catalogues, and sales receipts.
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1.2  Private governance
We examine the top-end market for high-valued fine art—specifically the auctions and pri-
vate sales at Christie’s and Sotheby’s, venues where the most prestigious paintings owned 
previously by private collectors, dealers and occasionally museums are traded (Singer and 
Lynch 1994). Despite the market dominance of those famous auction houses, the gov-
ernance system is not hierarchical. As Polanyi (1951) points out, abstract ideals such as 
“beauty”, “justice”, and “authenticity” cannot be imposed on market participants by an 
overarching authority. Tastes evolve as artists and gallerists create demand for new art 
forms or educate their customers to appreciate particular styles. Turnover is continuous as 
new galleries and artists become fashionable, established dealers retire, collections are dis-
persed, and new collectors with different appetites emerge. Each jurisdiction chooses how 
to define property rights. The organisational system must therefore give individuals free-
dom to structure their activities as they see fit in search of their abstract end-goals (Aligica 
and Tarko 2012).
The art market is not dominated by the ethnic or kinship networks often observed in 
informally governed markets (Bernstein 1992; Greif 1993; Landa 1994; Richman 2017). 
That is because governance challenges arise not only from insider opportunism, but also 
from (criminal and misinformed) outsiders, differences of opinion, and divergence of laws 
between jurisdictions. Collectors, dealers and auctioneers may not be aware of problems 
with the authenticity or legal title of a painting - or refuse to accept others’ definition of 
what constitutes an “authentic” painting or a “good” title.4 The system must therefore facil-
itate competition between taste-makers, dealers, market-makers, experts and other service 
providers.
We use the framework of polycentricity to analyse the art market’s governance system 
(Ostrom 2010). We show that the tertiary art market shares the key features of previously 
described polycentric systems, namely, many autonomous competing decision-making 
centers operating under an overarching set of rules (Aligica and Tarko 2012; McGinnis 
2016). By looking at the interests of and interactions between the actors within the system 
we can explain and rationalize the existing rules of the game and trace their origins. Trust 
in the art market largely is based on reputation and we observe a very interesting pattern 
of regulatory arbitrage for the highest valued objects: a flight to quality. The top auction 
houses have located in jurisdictions with strong legal protection for buyers and original 
owners. We also identify current challenges to the integrity of the system and show how 
private agents work to overcome them.
2  The market for fine art and private governance
The top end of the art market has several interesting features. Individual art objects are 
unique—we are dealing with an “extreme case of a heterogeneous commodity” (Thorsby 
1994, p. 4). For “noted” works of deceased artists, the supply is (or should be) entirely ine-
lastic. Collectors buy art for different reasons. As a consumer good, the decorative quality 
4 e.g. the world’s most expensive painting, Salvator Mundi, is considered by some experts to be an authen-
tic work of Leonardo da Vinci. Others consider it to be a poor copy, a painting by the Leonardo workshop, 
a deliberate forgery, or a painting that has been restored to the point of obliterating the original artist’s 
hand—whomever that may have been. (Lewis 2019).
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of an object provides immediate consumption services. Owning famous art also confers 
status. Well-known artworks are (Thorsten) Veblen goods: the higher the price, the more 
“elite” the owner (Plattner 1998). Furthermore, art may be bought as an inflation hedge 
or as an investment (Reitlinger 1961; Thorsby 1994). Prices for individual objects depend 
on developments in those interrelated markets: Deloitte (2016) describes art as a “passion 
asset”.
Art prices are highly volatile (Ashenfelter and Graddy 2011; Baumol 1986). Overall, 
the most important correlate of the expected return to owning art is the reputation of the 
artist (Thorsby 1994). However, high prices attract forgers who produce credible copies or 
paintings “in the style of” a fashionable painter. Art students’ or workshop copies may be 
bought by fraudsters who add a famous artist’s signature and a bogus provenance. Buy-
ers rarely have the expertise to identify fraud – or are misled by their enthusiasm when 
offered a “missing” masterpiece. Experts estimate that between 10% and 40% of the works 
of notable artists available for sale may be forged or “over-restored” (New York Times 
1999). Moreover, elevated prices tempt art thieves and looters into the market. Once a sto-
len object has passed through a series of bona fide owners and statutes of limitation have 
expired, it is difficult for a lay person to spot an impaired title. Art therefore is a credence 
good (Ekelund et al. 2017).
What maintains buyers’ evident trust in the market for high value fine art? Singer and 
Lynch (1997) point out that auction houses invest heavily in the production of information. 
Such investments raise the probability of authenticity and good titles, encourage risk averse 
bidders to come forward, and make bidding more competitive (Ashenfelter 1989). Higher 
prices raise the income premiums (rents) of auction houses. Indeed, we find many busi-
nesses specializing in answering the two key questions: “what is it” and “who owns it”? 
Even the best auction houses and museums occasionally are in the news over fakes, forger-
ies and looted items (e.g., Al Ahram 2013, BBC 2016). The very publicity associated with 
such cases suggests that mistakes are rare, but authenticity clearly is not 100% assured. Yet 
prosecutions are extremely rare, indicating that in practice it is not the state that orders the 
market and corrects mistakes. We therefore examine how private agents obtain, collate and 
share relevant information on art objects. We also analyze informal solutions for resolving 
disputes and correcting mistakes.
The academic study of polycentric governance traces to the work of Elinor and Vincent 
Ostrom and the Bloomington School (see Aligica and Boettke 2009; Cole and McGinnis 
2015; McGinnis 1999, 2016; Ostrom 1972, 1990, 2005, 2010; Ostrom et  al. 1961). Ini-
tially, that literature focused on common pool resources, but soon was extended to examine 
public goods’ provision, such as law enforcement and local government (Ostrom 2010). 
The literature on polycentric governance emphasizes the ability of people to design rules, 
processes, and enforcement mechanisms to capture benefits from cooperation. Gains are 
allocated in such ways that spontaneous order systems are sustainable over long time hori-
zons—without government intervention (McGinnis 2016).
Aligica and Tarko (2012) and Ostrom (2010) identify three basic features of polycen-
tric governance. Firstly, a multiplicity of decision-making centers, operating in distinct 
but overlapping areas. Secondly, stable, ordered relationships based on a system of rules 
that may be enforced institutionally or culturally. Thirdly, spontaneous order generated 
by evolutionary competition between agents using different ideas and methods. Current 
research into polycentricity applies the Ostroms’ insights to an ever wider set of complex 
governance systems, such as science, the free market and the common law (Aligica and 
Tarko 2012; Tarko 2015). However, not every complex, multi-actor system necessarily is a 
bona fide polycentric governance system in the spirit of the Bloomington School. If some 
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power-holders enforce rules for others, but are not accountable to the same restrictions, and 
the oppressed cannot change the rules to improve their outcomes, then the system is more 
accurately described as dominated rather than polycentric (McGinnis 2016). We first iden-
tify the active and latent decision-centers within the governance of the art market. We then 
describe the rules and norms governing that market, show how they incentivize agents to 
provide suitable services, and explore how insiders adapt the rules over time.
3  A polycentric private governance system
Art buyers bidding at high-profile art auctions seek to acquire enforceable titles to authen-
tic art objects. Achieving that goal implies two governance domains: governance of title 
and governance of authenticity.5 Within each governance domain, three critical governance 
functions can be identified: standard setting, monitoring/evaluation, and enforcement/dis-
pute resolution (Salter 2001; Shortland 2018). “Good” or “effective” governance requires 
the fulfilling all three functions at least at some threshold level (Agnafors 2013).
Before going into the details, we introduce the agents in the system here. Governments 
set standards regarding legal titles: each country defines what constitutes a “good title” 
within its jurisdiction. However, governments rarely allocate adequate resources into moni-
toring or enforcing titles. Regulatory arbitrage is possible (and, hence, interjurisdictional 
competition), activated by choosing the most suitable location for each sale. Art insurers 
set their own standards in the domain of titles, insisting that it should be impossible ever 
to obtain good title to stolen (or looted) items. Unlike governments, insurers have created 
institutions for monitoring, enforcement, and dispute resolution, making them the primary 
provider of governance services in the title domain.
Top-tier auction houses check the legal titles and allocate significant resources to evalu-
ating the authenticity of objects. Auctioneers decide how to market an object consigned for 
sale: as an authentic work of a noted artist, or as a copy, the work of a follower, or a work-
shop, and so on. Competition between auction houses is vigorous: selling works labelled 
as “authentic” brings higher commissions—but also the risk of discovery, loss of reputa-
tion, and claims for compensation from disappointed buyers. Monitoring and evaluation 
are carried out both pre- and post-sale by collectors, professional buyers, and dealers sup-
ported by a range of experts. Experts are in competition with each other to provide credible 
evaluations of an object’s authenticity. Scholars peer-review each other’s work, pointing 
out flaws in others’ techniques and innovating to enhance their own reputations. Interven-
tion and enforcement may be carried out by courts, but in practice auction houses usually 
prefer private dispute resolutions. Most cases are settled informally, but legal experts may 
be employed.
3.1  Governments
Two main legal instruments order the art market. The law on theft is straightforward. How-
ever, the relevant question for the tertiary art market is how to adjudicate between the legit-
imate claim of someone who bought an object in good faith (often from a prior good-faith 
owner) and the person who owned it before a theft. The United States (and, in particular, 
5 The domains sometimes are called “dimensions” or “components” of governance.
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New York) applies the nemo dat quod non habet rule: buyers can acquire good title only 
if the seller had good title (Yip 2010). The rule protects the property rights of a legitimate 
owner whose property was stolen or expropriated unlawfully over time, regardless of how 
many people have bought the item in good faith since the initial theft (Yip 2010). Euro-
pean jurisdictions usually apply the principle of “adverse possession”: after a specified 
time limit a bona fide buyer acquires “good title” legally regardless of the object’s origin, 
putting the onus on the victims of theft to track down stolen objects. If a stolen object is 
identified within the given time limit, it can be seized by the police or customs’ officers. 
However, law enforcers do not routinely monitor art sales. In 2018–2019, the UK’s Met-
ropolitan Police art unit consisted of two detective constables, who were forced largely to 
rely on interested parties to bring problems to their attention.6
The second body of law applicable to the art market is that of fraud. Fraud means delib-
erately making a false or misleading representation or withholding salient information with 
the intent of making a gain or cause (the risk of) loss to another.7 Regarding forgeries, the 
charge would be fraud by “false representation”. That charge is relatively straightforward 
to prosecute. In public auctions, however, the legal issue usually is one of “failing to dis-
close information”. Here, the claimant must prove that the sellers had in hand the relevant 
information, that they were under legal obligation to disclose it, and dishonestly withheld 
it to make a gain. Yet. no absolute standard of authenticity exists. The authorship of many 
art objects simply cannot be attributed with certainty and experts often provide conflict-
ing “opinions”. Bringing a successful prosecution (even under the Trade Descriptions Act) 
therefore is very difficult. Few people even attempt it (Chapell and Polk 2009). The legal 
system therefore leaves gaping voids in the governance of the art market. We examine how 
they are filled by private governance.
3.2  Insurers and the market for stolen art
Insurers provide private governance services in the art market to limit the volume and value 
of stolen art. If stolen art could be sold freely, art theft and insurance premiums would rise. 
Underwriters specializing in the insurance of high value artwork reduce both the ease and 
profitability of art theft. The former is achieved by offering a host of security consulting 
services for art collectors (Private Art Collector 2014) and by shielding the identities of 
private collectors at auctions. The latter is accomplished by making it very risky to sell 
high value stolen art in the open market (Artbusiness News 2015)—regardless of whether 
the auction is conducted in a jurisdiction that applies the nemo dat rule.
The main private governance instrument is the Art Loss Register (ALR): the world’s 
most comprehensive database of missing art and artefacts. The ALR was created in 1991 
by a group of specialist underwriters at Lloyd’s of London. Insurers, police and private 
individuals can record details of any art object that is reported stolen in the register (Dur-
ney 2011). National police databases usually contain just a few thousand items and it often 
is cumbersome to search them (The Times 2014). By contrast, the ALR contains informa-
tion on around 500,000 items and can be consulted for a fee or by subscription.8 Auction 
6 The entire Metropolitan Police art unit was reassigned to investigating the Grenfell tower fire in August 
2017 for several months (Telegraph 2017).
7 Whether an actual loss occurred is irrelevant, as is whether the attempted deception succeeded (UK Fraud 
Act 2006).
8 May 2019 communication from Julian Radcliffe, owner of the ALR.
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houses, dealers, and the organizers of art fairs routinely consult the register. ALR staff 
check the provenance of each item and look for matches in the database. An object can 
be bought or sold “in good faith” (which affords the buyer some protection) only if it has 
passed the ALR test. Both Christie’s and Sotheby’s are ALR shareholders. For many years, 
the ALR enjoyed monopoly status and still is considered by many as the “super-authority” 
on stolen art. The quality of the ALR’s services is monitored constantly by its clients, who 
suffer a reputational loss if they are exposed as selling or having sold stolen objects. Since 
2014, the ALR has faced competition from the Art Recovery Group, indicating that the 
market for the governance of title is contestable: shortcomings and mistakes can be pun-
ished by transferring business elsewhere (Independent 2016; Private Art Investor 2015).
If title problems are raised by an ALR search, auction houses postpone the sale or reject 
the consignment discreetly. It is up to the owner to resolve the title issue. Because the art 
market is global, it frequently is not clear what law applies: the jurisdiction of the owner, 
the last point of sale, and the claimant all may apply different standards. Without an abso-
lute international standard of “good title”, the issue often is settled by private arbitration 
(e.g., Maria Altman’s case over Klimt’s “Woman in Gold”) or negotiated by private law 
firms. Stolen paintings sometimes can be retrieved informally from the criminal under-
world, once thieves realize that the object is unsaleable.9
3.3  Auction houses and experts
Before accepting a consignment, auction house experts screen every item for authenticity 
and legal ownership. Ideally, an object’s provenance should resolve both issues, but the 
full paper trail of historical documents remains intact only rarely over the centuries (Char-
ney 2015). Moreover, when provenance research was the main governance instrument for 
establishing authenticity, fraudsters infiltrated and falsified the archives of major collec-
tions and sold insignificant paintings on the strength of entirely bogus provenances. Oth-
ers sold forgeries with the impeccable provenances of genuine paintings and then sold the 
originals as well, doubling their profits (Charney 2015; Salisbury and Sujo 2009). In-house 
experts therefore examine each object visually for the possibility of fraud. If suspicions 
arise, they consult established external experts in the relevant field, including connoisseurs, 
art historians and scientists.
A connoisseur is someone with considerable experience in their field, perceived to have 
“the eye” or instinct to pronounce whether an object is “consistent” with the style of the 
artist or period (Hook 2013; Spencer 2004). However, even highly respected connoisseurs 
make mistakes (e.g., Lewis 2019, p. 171), and their opinions can be influenced by many 
extraneous factors (Ginsburgh and Van Ours 2003). Art historians therefore also consult 
the archival record. They examine the contexts of artists and workshops and produce time-
lines of output or styles. Scientists test whether the materials used in making the object are 
of the correct period and origin. They often specialize in particular periods, object types, or 
analytical methods. For example, modern forgeries might contain titanium white—a pig-
ment that became available only in 1916, followed by several subsequent reformulations 
(Rogge and Arslanoglu 2019).
9 The ALR offers an art recovery service for owners frustrated with (the lack of) police assistance in track-
ing and recovering stolen art. That option is controversial, as rewards are offered for information leading 
to the recovery of stolen items, making it possible that thieves benefit from their crimes (New York Times 
2013).
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When forgers become aware of new testing procedures, they may acquire the testing 
equipment or submit their works for testing posing as innocent collectors (Amore 2015; 
Charney 2015; The Guardian 2018). The result is an arms race between forgers and aca-
demic and commercial scientists. Analytical techniques continuously are refined to main-
tain reputations for reliably identifying fakes. However, if a scientist pronounces an object 
to be of the “correct period/material”, the question of authorship still needs to be settled 
(Fincham 2017).
A positive evaluation by a key expert can set the price of an object skyrocketing. Com-
mercial pressure to “authenticate” objects thus is considerable. However, each opinion that 
is exposed subsequently as ill-founded or opportunistic undermines the expert’s reputation. 
The overriding goal of the scholarly community is to protect the integrity of artists’ oeuvres 
and the historical record (Spencer 2004; Fincham 2017). Querying items subsequently 
exposed as a fake or forgery raises the experts’ academic status and the (commercial) 
demand for their expertise. Museum curators, scholars, dealers and professional buyers 
thus routinely study auction catalogs and visit pre-sale exhibitions. They alert auctioneers 
to anything that looks “wrong” and needs further investigation. In the small community of 
scholarly experts, gossip quickly discredits opportunists and authentication methods that 
have been “cracked” by forgers. Such reputational solutions based on continuous dealings 
are common in private governance systems (Leeson 2008, 2014; Stringham 2003).
The system works well as long as experts value the future returns from being perceived 
as truthful and accurate more than the short-term gains from supporting a dubious object. 
With continual innovations in forensic science and lively academic debates about attribu-
tions, charlatans and opportunists must expect to be discovered eventually (Charney 2015). 
Yet, experts sometimes authenticate opportunistically when their time horizons are short,10 
when they are paid to conduct research for an interested party, or when the prestige gains 
from potentially rehabilitating a “missing masterpiece” are so high that they develop their 
own cognitive biases (e.g., Margaret Dalivalle’s and Martin Kemp’s research on Salva-
tor Mundi, according to Lewis 2019). Knowing that, the art market looks increasingly for 
expert consensus on high-profile works rather than acting on a single endorsement. Thus, 
“[t]he speculative attribution of unknown or relatively unknown works to major masters is 
a graveyard for historians’ reputations” (Kemp 2007, p. 201).
The academic process of building consensus on the authenticity of objects thus is fairly 
robust, albeit slow (e.g., National Geographic 2015, The Art Newspaper January 2016). 
Even scientific opinions are not completely watertight. Mistakes can be made: interpreta-
tion of test results is far closer to the opinion of the connoisseur than many scientists would 
like to admit. While experts debate attributions, auction houses must maintain the trust of 
the potential sellers. Auctioneers would be ill-advised publicly to cast doubt on the reputa-
tion of objects offered for sale: today’s seller is tomorrow’s buyer. The system therefore has 
not developed a mechanism to force sellers, dealers, or auction houses to disclose negative 
expert reports. Even if no explicit confidentiality clause is inserted into the expert’s con-
tract, it is “understood” that damaging information will not be divulged to third parties. 
Negative expert opinions sometimes become public if a case is taken to court and it may 
then be found—as in the case of the forgeries traded by the Knoedler Gallery - that multi-
ple experts had raised concerns (e.g., The Art Newspaper August 2016).
10 Lewis (2019, p. 171) and Spencer (2004, p. 75) supply examples of ageing specialists whose connois-
seurly opinions reached “junk status” among their peers when their standards slipped.
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An item’s auction catalog entry therefore is the outcome of a deliberative process. The 
critical information is provided in the Bold Print Heading or in UPPERCASE type in 
the first line of the catalog. In fine art sales, the first line provides information about the 
painter. The item’s entry then gives a brief description: the title of the work, the medium, 
its size, whether and where it is signed and when it was produced. Any damage and repairs 
are mentioned. One or several pictures may accompany the text. That is followed by the 
auctioneer’s estimate of the likely range of the sales price. The catalog also details the 
provenance of the object. Ideally, the first entry in the Provenance section links the object 
directly to its maker, followed by an unbroken line of owners and consensual sales. Prior 
owners are disclosed only if their collection is prestigious and their names add to the cachet 
(and, hence, price) of the object. Mostly the catalogs list when and where the object was 
sold. In addition, catalogs often state the identity of the person confirming the authentic-
ity of a painting. Inclusion in a widely accepted catalog of an artist’s works—a Catalogue 
Raisonné – is the gold standard.11 Otherwise, favorable expert opinions and less respected 
catalogues are cited. The final section of the catalog entry details any occasions when the 
object has been exhibited publicly and any books in which it has been included. That infor-
mation adds prestige, but also reassures buyers that any defective titles, restitution claims, 
and criticisms of the current attribution already would have come to light.12
Only the title line of the auction catalog is guaranteed. Doubts about attributions are 
indicated by adding a question mark or describing an object as “Workshop of…”, or “Fol-
lower of…” rather than just the presumed artist’s name. The description below the title 
line represents the opinion of the auction house (or the cited experts) and is not covered 
by any form of warranty. That is understood by all. A low estimate reflects the auctioneer’s 
opinion about how compromised the object is by the difficulty of establishing its maker. It 
is then up to buyers to decide whether they want to take the risk of trying to rehabilitate the 
object—or buy it because they like it anyway. In any case, for some buyers the perception 
of authenticity may be more important than the truth (Charney 2015, p. 23).
Despite considerable effort to establish an objective opinion before the sales catalog is 
printed, mistakes happen occasionally. Expert and public scrutiny of the auction catalog 
and pre-sale exhibitions act as further gatekeepers to problematic paintings. If credible res-
titution claims are made by the original owners, or a respected expert casts doubt on an 
attribution, objects are withdrawn from sale until the question of ownership or authenticity 
has been settled.
To reassure buyers further, auction houses offer legal protections, detailed in the “Terms 
of Guarantee”: Subject to specific exclusions, sales can be rescinded within five years of 
the sale if the description “set forth in the Bold Type Heading … is not substantially cor-
rect based on a fair reading of the catalogue…” (Sotheby’s 1989, p. 2; emphasis in origi-
nal). However, auction houses are not liable if the “catalogue description at the date of 
the auction was in accordance with the then generally accepted opinion of scholars or 
experts…” (Christie’s 1994, p. 117). Liability also excludes forgeries that come to light 
using new scientific techniques “not generally accepted for use until after publication of 
the catalogue” (Sotheby’s 1989, p. 2) or “… by means of a process which at the date of the 
11 Several rival catalogs by different authors may be available, but insiders will consider one catalog to be 
authoritative or at least conditionally accurate (Findlay 2004). Catalogs are revised periodically, and art-
works included previously may later be demoted (Fincham 2017).
12 For example, the Christie’s sales catalog for Salvator Mundi features copiously its inclusion in the 
National Gallery’s blockbuster Leonardo exhibition.
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auction was unreasonably expensive or impracticable or likely to have caused damage to 
the lot…” (Christie’s 1994, p. 117). No guarantee applies to the information provided in 
the lower-case type below the bold type heading (Sotheby’s 1989, p. 2).13
Rescinding a sale therefore is difficult (Chappell and Polk 2009). Proving that a seller 
deliberately or carelessly misled a buyer involves a protracted legal process.14 The usual 
auction house practice therefore is to “under-catalogue” (Hook 2013). Senior managers in 
auction houses are confident in their pre-sale due diligence: “If you sued us you would 
lose…”15 However, in the art world nobody gains from a public and acrimonious legal 
dispute. US auction houses’ conditions of sale (and for online bidders) explicitly deter legal 
actions by stipulating that any “dispute shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitra-
tion in New York in accordance with the International Arbitration Rules of the Interna-
tional Center for Dispute Resolution”.16
In practice, auction houses tend to “cancel the sale” and refund disappointed buy-
ers’ money to maintain their confidence and loyalty. Most art collectors acquire multiple 
objects for their collections. A reputation for a gentlemanly attitude toward resolving mis-
takes is an important aspect of non-price competition in the market. When Sotheby’s deci-
sion to cancel the sale of a suspected Frans Hals forgery and reimburse USD 11.75 million 
to the disappointed collector was attacked in a 2019 court case, Sotheby’s barrister stated 
that acting otherwise “would have been corrosive for the art market” (The Art Newspaper 
2019).
The top auction houses often choose to absorb losses even though the consignment con-
tract usually contains a rescission clause, meaning that the auction house could undo the 
sale legally (even after several years) and force the seller to return the money received for 
the object (Wallace 2010). The top auction houses will do that only in exceptional circum-
stances—i.e., when they suspect that the seller was involved in deliberate fraud or grossly 
negligent, such as the case discussed above of Sotheby’s suing the Mark Weiss Gallery 
over the Frans Hals forgery. It would be damaging to an auction house’s business if bona 
fide sellers were concerned that the proceeds from a sale might be demanded back from 
them until whatever time limit was agreed had elapsed (Wallace 2010). Sotheby’s has, in 
fact, withdrawn several fakes and forgeries from the market, to form a collection some-
times referred to as the “Black Museum” (Kiddell and Bartram 1990). Clearly, reputational 
private governance solutions are preferable to court action.
The discussion above highlights the efforts undertaken by auction houses to ensure that 
only authentic pieces enter the high value art market—or that doubts clearly are indicated 
in advance of the sale. The auction houses bear a significant financial risk if they have to 
relieve disappointed buyers of essentially worthless objects—although they can purchase 
insurance to hedge against that risk. All such provisions must be financed. A buyer’s pre-
mium therefore is charged by adding a percentage to the “hammer price”. That premium 
often is substantial: “On all lots we charge 30.25% of the hammer price up to and including 
13 The waiver of liability creates incentives to “improve” objects. For example, entirely bogus swastikas 
and gothic script sometimes are added to the back of suitable artwork to mark them as (highly collectable) 
“degenerate art”.
14 For example, the Knoedler gallery in New York peddled fakes from 1994 to 2008, but was closed only 
in November 2011. One of its victims decided to sue and it took 4 years for the case to reach the court (Art 
News 2016).
15 Interview 21 February 2017.
16 https ://onlin eonly .chris ties.com/terms -and-condi tions /209, similarly at https ://www.sothe bys.com/en/
terms -condi tions .
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€50,000, 24.2% on that part of the hammer price over €50,000 and up to and including 
€1,600,000, and 14.52% of that part of the hammer price above €1,600,000” (Christie’s 
2016). In addition, the seller generally is charged a commission and may be billed for any 
expert opinions requested on their behalf.
In summary—carrying out the complex governance functions in the high value art mar-
ket is expensive. It requires significant internal and external expertise, exhibition and auc-
tion rooms in the world’s most glamourous (and expensive) locations and (self-) insurance 
for occasional mistakes.17 Collectors and dealers pay the substantial buyers’ premium in 
exchange for the services provided.
4  Interactions between private and formal governance
The booming art market has attracted a new class of collectors in recent decades: commer-
cial investors and super-rich businesspeople. Owners of multi-million-dollar objects often 
are frustrated by the seemingly antiquated art world where scholars openly disparage their 
“masterpieces” or refuse to authenticate their “finds” based on opaque criteria. Changing 
social norms on restitution and online research have made it easier for former owners of 
stolen artworks to locate and reclaim them. Some have turned to the courts to settle authen-
ticity and ownership disputes. How has such litigation affected the functioning of the pri-
vate governance system?
In the authenticity domain, a series of art fraud cases have raised the bar for due dili-
gence and credible evidence. Auction houses are more cautious in guarding their reputa-
tions. They carefully scrutinize the objects, their provenances, and the quality of expert 
endorsements. Despite the skepticism of art historians and connoisseurs, scientific dating 
techniques and compositional analysis have become standard procedures whenever con-
cerns are raised. In 2016, Sotheby’s acquired its own scientific laboratory for conservation 
and analysis to reduce the impact of expensive settlements and rising insurance premiums 
on its bottom line (The Guardian 2018).
Yet, litigation also undermines the functioning of private governance. Many experts are 
intimidated by the threat of potentially ruinous lawsuits—even if they are likely to be exon-
erated eventually. The problem arises especially when experts hold negative views on an 
object’s authenticity. For an academic or a trust charged with managing an artist’s legacy, it 
often is better to say nothing than risk a lawsuit funded by high-powered commercial inter-
ests. For art produced in artists’ workshops judging “authenticity” is particularly problem-
atic. For example, Andy Warhol’s famous silkscreen prints largely were produced by studio 
assistants. Nonetheless, the Warhol Institute’s authentication committee regularly consid-
ered new submissions for the Andy Warhol Catalogue Raisonné—until disappointed own-
ers of unsuccessful submissions sued. Although the Institute won its cases, its directors dis-
solved the Warhol authentication board in 2012: the cost of litigation dwarfed the proceeds 
from authentication services (Fincham 2017; The Observer 2011). Other authentication 
boards representing artists whose studios mass-produced output followed suit—leading to 
a “deep freeze in authentication” (Wall Street Journal 2014). Amore (2015, p. 52) cites a 
17 Second-tier auction houses charge similar buyers’ commissions and compete directly with the top auc-
tion houses in quality assurance to build reputations for expertise in niche fields, e.g., Bonhams on Euro-
pean ceramics.
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letter from Christie’s: “It is our belief, and generally accepted in our industry, that Pollock 
paintings not listed in the catalogue raisonné, are rarely accepted in the market place.”
Similarly, when the National Gallery deliberated whether or not to include Salva-
tor Mundi in its 2011 Leonardo exhibition, only two of the five experts consulted whole-
heartedly endorsed the painting as Leonardo’s work. The two dissenters and the ambiva-
lent scholar kept their opinions private (Lewis 2019). Their caution enabled Christie’s to 
refer to a “broad consensus” of scholarly opinion in favor of a Leonardo attribution in their 
auction catalog. Academic experts vetting art fairs often prefer to make vague statements 
about objects “not being in keeping with the high standards of this fair”, rather than stating 
doubts about authenticity.18 The threat of litigation thus can suppress an open and honest 
debate on attributions. Occasionally, the absence of debate allows high-powered interests 
to sell dubious objects to less informed collectors. However, discerning collectors consult 
the key experts through their networks discreetly. Thus, Salvator Mundi was turned down 
by several museums after its exhibition in the British National Gallery before eventually 
being sold to a Russian, and then to a Middle Eastern magnate (Lewis 2019).
In the title domain, a recent challenge for the art market arose from restitution claims 
for paintings sold by (usually Jewish) owners under duress or looted in Nazi Germany and 
occupied Europe. Under nemo dat, no subsequent owner has a full legal title, even if the 
painting was acquired in good faith after a string of previous sales. Since the mid-1990s, 
more information has been made available for victims of the Nazi regime to track down sto-
len paintings. Several paintings were withdrawn during pre-sale viewings: sales proceeded 
only after restitution claims were settled. Eventually, paintings sold in Europe (especially 
in Paris) between 1932 and 1945 became unsaleable in the top auction houses (Hook 2013, 
p. 251). Restitution cases can take several years in the courts and neither side’s reputation 
rises in the process. However, the issue can now be resolved using private dispute resolu-
tion services offered by law firms.19 The firms compete with businesses such as the Art 
Recovery Group, which broker deals between current and former owners (Amore 2015; 
Independent 2016; Private Art Investor 2015).
Public law occasionally conflicts directly with private governance in the art market. Yet, 
Harris (2018) shows that private governance can still function when agents’ legitimacy to 
govern is challenged by the state. A judge can overrule a respected expert and pronounce 
an object “more likely than not” to be genuine. However, such judgments do not shift 
expert consensus on the object’s authenticity and the market does not accept them, leaving 
the object unsaleable (Spencer 2004). Realising that, US judges have become more cau-
tious about getting drawn into disputes on authenticity (New York Times 2012). Similarly, 
the civil law concept of droit moral gives artists (and sometimes their heirs) the right to 
authenticate works regardless of their expertise or financial interest in the matter (Fincham 
2017). Opportunistic heirs’ opinions, while valid legally, do not affect academic opinion on 
which works properly belong into the historical record. The art world therefore may reject 
the holders of droit moral as experts and discount or ignore their opinions (Findlay 2004; 
Spencer 2004, pp. 74, 194).
More problematic is that the droit moral and the US Visual Artists Rights Act 1990 also 
gives artists the right to disown their works under certain conditions, leaving the affected 
objects unauthored and unsaleable at public auctions. For disowned works, expert opinions 
are relegated to facilitating private sales. Yet, artists who use their legal rights to challenge 
18 Interview with TEFAF vetting expert March 2019.
19 Interview with solicitor June 2018.
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owners’ property claims (Cady Noland being a famous example) face significant costs: they 
undermine the demand for their own work among investors and may themselves face litiga-
tion (Art SY 2016). Economic self-interest thus ensures that they remain a small minority.
The overall effect of litigation on private governance in the top-tier art market thus is 
twofold: over time the quality of governance has improved, but the supply of objects that 
meet the higher standard is restricted. Many artworks effectively are “in limbo” until cred-
ible methods are found to settle their statuses. In the meantime, auction houses, dealers and 
collectors advertise their search for means of unblocking the market, signaling how much 
they would pay for a credible certificate of authenticity or ownership. As restricted supply 
creates price inflation, an ever-stronger financial incentive exists for agents to develop the 
required services.
Our final question is whether the legal system dominates private governance. In true 
polycentric systems, the rules can be changed by insiders who feel oppressed by them 
(Ostrom 2010; McGinnis 2016). That likewise is true for the art market. Nemo dat is a 
territorial rule: other conceptions of justice exist. For example, the Swiss legal system 
enforces the property rights of bona fide owners. If someone buys an object in good faith, 
his or her title supersedes that of the original owner after 5 years (Yip 2010). For the origi-
nal owner, 5 years usually is an unrealistic timeframe: stolen paintings often stay hidden 
for decades. A New York court pronounced in 1991 that “To place the burden of locating 
stolen artwork on the true owner and to foreclose the rights of that owner to recover its 
property if the burden is not met would, we believe, encourage illicit trafficking in stolen 
art….”20 The nemo dat rule therefore perfectly suits the interest of insurers, who must pre-
vent a lively open market in stolen art.
If the major auction houses felt that the Swiss law was more suited for underpinning the 
trade in high-value art, they could locate in Zurich and Geneva. Yet, they choose to locate 
in New York: the jurisdiction that upholds the world’s toughest form of nemo dat (Yip 
2010). Buyers acquiring art with defective titles must be extremely careful about export-
ing, exhibiting, or selling the objects elsewhere. Locating in New York enhances trust in 
the system and the reputations of the auction houses. Christie’s and Sotheby’s sales rooms 
in London, Hong Kong and Dubai do not engage in regulatory arbitrage. Even for online 
sales, the terms of sale state explicitly: “This agreement and any rights arising outside 
this agreement shall be governed by the laws of the state of New York;”21 moreover, any 
“action that may arise under the Terms of Use shall be commenced and be heard in the 
appropriate court in the State of New York, County of New York.”22 Choosing the toughest 
law to govern transactions enhances the companies’ international reputations.
Generally, the private governance system helps art collectors and investors to avoid 
entanglement in costly, unpredictable, drawn-out and reputation-damaging litigation. The 
system has parallels in diamond traders “opting out” of the legal system and creating their 
own arbitration processes (Bernstein 1992; Richman 2017, Stringham 2003). Law enforce-
ment is used as an “on demand” service. The police are called when market participants 
identify thieves or fraudsters in their midst but are not deployed against bona fide custom-
ers. Dealers thought to be complicit in fraud are dragged through the courts and humiliated 
publicly—such as the Knoedler and Mark Weiss Galleries. Such punishment strengthens 
20 Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 320 (N.Y. 1991).
21 https ://www.chris ties.com/pdf/onlin eonly /ECOMM ERCE_CONDI TIONS _OF_SALE_CINC_Jan_2018.
pdf; accessed June 2019.
22 https ://www.sothe bys.com/en/terms -condi tions ; accessed June 2019.
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the incentives for others to safeguard their reputations. The fear of scandal and the poten-
tial cost of having to defend their opinions, techniques and practices in court leads experts 
to withdraw from the business when they become aware of weaknesses in their procedures. 
In the short run, such exit can paralyze specific market segments, but in the longer term it 
enhances the resilience of the system as improved services emerge.
Changes in societal norms—restitution being an excellent example—are sometimes sig-
naled by court cases. Once the case law is defined clearly, the private governance regime 
reacts. For individuals, litigation is so cumbersome and expensive that it is better for the 
market to freeze. Large-scale trading resumes when a viable private governance alternative 
is developed. Most restitution disputes now are resolved voluntarily for reputational gain 
and mutual financial advantage by negotiation, or arbitration.
5  Conclusions
The market for fine art is challenged continually by criminals and unfortunate, innocent 
owners of stolen or faked paintings. Art is a credence good: confidence in the system is 
essential for high prices to be paid and received. Trust can be considered to be a common 
pool resource that is depleted by opportunism, crime, fraud and negligence. We showed 
that formal law alone cannot sustain trust: the “art police” is under-funded and court cases 
are cumbersome, costly and embarrassingly public. Insiders therefore have created rules 
and processes to protect their valuable common pool resource: by restricting access, moni-
toring transactions, sanctioning defectors and providing cost-effective dispute resolution 
(Ostrom 2010).
The key to successful private governance is incentive-compatibility. Private actors cre-
ate and enforce rules when they have a clear profit motive for doing so. Participating at the 
lucrative top end of the market in fine art—where prices can reach hundreds of millions of 
dollars—requires a reputation for selling top-quality items with a “no quibbles” guarantee. 
Reputational concerns, in turn, need a robust screening procedure by agents specializing in 
knowledge production. Experts must protect their reputations: pleasing sellers with unwar-
ranted authentication or ownership certificates undermines their perceived trustworthiness 
and future business opportunities. Insurers created governance instruments to foreclose the 
market in stolen art and to underpin the market for art insurance. Stolen and looted art 
registers are private enterprises whose reputation is based on providing timely, comprehen-
sive, and accurate information.
Obtaining expert opinions can cost thousands of dollars. That expense is not worthwhile 
for most objects, but crucial if something is worth a million dollars if it is genuine and just 
a few hundred dollars if it is not. The market for high value art therefore is well-governed, 
while the market for cheaper objects is riddled with fakes and looted items. As Ekelund 
et al. (2017) point out, the rational art thief or forger will target those segments of the mar-
ket wherein (private) enforcement is lax. The second-tier art market often locates in civil 
law jurisdictions, which offer stronger protections to sellers (Schwenzer 2016, p. 80) and 
bona fide owners (Yip 2010). Some internet platforms and freeports offer trading opportu-
nities entirely removed from public scrutiny. A limit therefore exists to what private gov-
ernance can achieve in tackling art crime. Given the squeeze on public budgets, the “Wild-
West” situation in the wider art market likely will persist (The Economist 2013).
Private governance in the art market has an interesting relationship to formal legal sys-
tems. Auctions for the highest value art are conducted in venues where legal rules reassure 
 Public Choice
1 3
buyers that failures in private governance will be punished severely. Yet, having chosen 
a restrictive legal framework, market participants generally prefer private resolution over 
court action. The law is used by insiders to punish fraud and theft and put rogue traders out 
of business. Occasionally, the courts clarify or redefine rules and sub-markets freeze. Stop-
ping trade in troublesome objects enhances the overall reputation of the system and drives 
up prices (and commissions!). Frozen markets thus trigger a search for improved private 
governance solutions, creating opportunities for new experts and services. The governance 
system described herein is not a definitive solution to a static problem. It is an evolving 
system in which competing agents respond continuously to new challenges.
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